

Ukraine-Poland partnership: the security dimension in the context of the full-scale russian invasion

Abstract

The article is devoted to the study of the security dimension of the Ukrainian-Polish partnership in the context of the full-scale Russian invasion that began in February 2022. The purpose of the study is to analyze the conceptual and practical aspects of security cooperation between Ukraine and Poland, in particular in the context of military, intelligence and cyber cooperation. The key objectives are: 1) to explore the features of the strategic partnership in the security sphere; 2) to assess practical tools for implementing security cooperation; and 3) to analyze the role of Poland in coordinating international support for Ukraine. The study is based on the analysis of scientific sources, official documents and empirical data obtained in 2022–2024.

Keywords

Ukrainian-Polish partnership, security cooperation, Russo-Ukrainian war, military assistance, cybersecurity, Lublin Triangle


Abstrakt

Artykuł poświęcony jest omówieniu wymiaru bezpieczeństwa partnerstwa polsko-ukraińskiego w kontekście pełnoskalowej inwazji rosyjskiej, która rozpoczęła się w lutym 2022 roku. Celem omówienia jest analiza koncepcyjnych i praktycznych aspektów współpracy między Ukrainą a Polską w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa, w szczególności w kontekście współpracy wojskowej, wywiadowczej i cybernetycznej. Kluczowe zadania: 1) ukazanie cech partnerstwa strategicznego w sferze bezpieczeństwa; 2) ocena praktycznych narzędzi realizacji współpracy w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa; 3) analiza roli Polski w koordynacji międzynarodowego wsparcia dla Ukrainy. Opracowanie opiera się na analizie źródeł naukowych, dokumentów urzędowych i danych empirycznych uzyskanych w latach 2022–2024.

Słowa kluczowe

partnerstwo ukraińsko-polskie, współpraca w zakresie bezpieczeństwa, wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska, pomoc wojskowa, cyberbezpieczeństwo, Trójkąt Lubelski.

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Problem statement

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 was a turning point for Ukrainian-Polish relations, transforming Poland from a regional partner into a key strategic ally. The security dimension of cooperation covers a wide range of activities: from the supply of weapons to the coordination of logistics and intelligence sharing. The study of this aspect is important for understanding modern geopolitical processes in Central and Eastern Europe and the role of bilateral cooperation in countering Russian aggression.

Identification of the previously unresolved parts of the general problem. The analysis of the security partnership of Ukraine and Poland in wartime is insufficiently systematized in the literature. Research on solving certain problematic aspects of Ukraine's security and military-technical cooperation at different stages of the evolution of its modern statehood was initiated by various researchers, including Polish (V. Balyuk, K. Jendraszyk, M. Petras, B. Surmach, I. Topolsky, R. Zienba and others) and Ukrainian (V. Badrak, S. Vidniansky, V. Horbulin, L. Hubytskyy, B. Humenyuka, R. Demchyshak, M. Doroshko, Yu. Martynov, G. Perepelytsia, V. Zaluzhnyy and others) scholars and practitioners. The issues of regional security and partner countries' support for Ukraine in the military-technical sector under a full-scale war have only occasionally invited scientific reflections and generalizations. Separate scholarly and analytical studies are devoted to the Ukrainian-Polish strategic—the rein security and military-technical—partnership (Demchyshak, 2024; Hubytskyy & Melnyk, 2024; Jędraszczyk, 2010; Kozats'kyy, 2024; Kyrydon & Troyan 2023; Partnerstwo strategiczne Polski i Ukrainy w warunkach zmiany systemu międzynarodowego, 2024; Pelletier, 2024; Sanzharevs'kyy & Zhovtenko & Troyan 2021; Surmacz, 2002; Zaluzhnyy, 2023).

The purpose of this article is to study the conceptual foundations and practical tools of security cooperation, and to assess its impact on regional stability. The research methodology is based on a systemic approach that combines constructivism, realism, and critical security analysis. Analysis of international structures in terms of their adaptability to the challenges of war is also used.

Presentation of the main material

The beginning of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war in February 2022 catalyzed a rethinking of the role of Poland as a partner of Ukraine. If until 2022 Ukrainian-Polish relations were mostly stable, but not always harmonious, with the beginning of the invasion Poland emerged as a strategic ally, providing Ukraine not only with military assistance, but also with humanitarian, economic and political support (Bevz, 2023, 25).

Help for Ukrainian refugees was the first and most emotional dimension of the partnership. From February to August 2022, Poland received more than 1.5 million Ukrainians who had become victims of the war. Reception was organized at both the state and local levels—reception points were created, social services were provided, and Polish schools were opened for Ukrainian children (Ociepa-Kicińska & Gorzałczyńska-Koczkodaj, 2022, 7086). Polish society showed unprecedented solidarity, despite the strain on infrastructure and the labor market. The Polish government adopted a special law that allowed Ukrainians to legally work, study and use medical services (Stępień-Załużka & Uliasz, 2023, 59).

Military support was another salient aspect. Poland was one of the first states to transfer defense weapons to Ukraine, including portable anti-aircraft missile systems, T-72 tanks, armored vehicles and ammunition (Drozdov, 2024). In addition to supplying weapons, important logistics hubs for the transit of aid from other NATO countries were established in the territory of Poland. Joint work with international partners in the Ramstein and G7 formats has showed that Poland not only supports Ukraine, but also coordinates global approaches to ensuring the defense capability of the Ukrainian state (Melnyk & Hubytskyy, 2024, 124).

In total, from the beginning of 2022 to the beginning of 2025, that is, over the almost three years of Ukraine's counteraction to the full-scale Russian armed invasion, Poland provided 46 packages of various types of weapons and ammunition. Their total value, together with other forms of support to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in particular medical aid, training, logistics and the supply, maintenance and repair of equipment, exceeded 4 billion EUR (Porozumienie o współpracy w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa pomiędzy Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą od 08 lipca 2024 roku).



Cross-border cooperation between regions has also intensified. Since 2022, more than 200 new interregional initiatives have been launched, including specialist exchange programs, joint educational projects and supplies of essential goods. For example, Rzeszów and Lviv concluded an updated cooperation agreement, which provides for support for business, medicine and logistics (Kruglashov & Sabadash, 2024, 40). EU-funded infrastructure programs are being implemented in Ukraine through Poland (Volkova, 2023, 29).

Such a multidimensional cooperation is explained not only by political practicality, but also by profound changes in the Polish public's perception of Ukraine. A sociological research study conducted in mid-2023 found that more than 85% of Poles supported partnership with Ukraine as a long-term security strategy (Demchyshak, 2024). In this context, the information component is also important, and Polish media crucially broadcast a pro-Ukrainian position, highlighting the two countries' common historical memory and struggles for freedom (Stępień-Załucka & Uliasz, 2023).

The Ukrainian-Polish partnership has undergone a significant political evolution. Warsaw became an active advocate for Ukraine in the structures of the European Union and backed the granting of candidate status, the supply of military equipment and macro-financial assistance to Ukraine (Zhelikhovskiy & Tykhonenko, 2023). Polish leaders, in particular President Andrzej Duda, have regularly visited Kyiv, which symbolized solidarity even in the most dangerous periods. The development of inter-parliamentary contacts and close coordination between the ministries of defense, foreign affairs and infrastructure has also been observed (Gorbatenko, 2023, 673). A special role is played by strategic interaction under the Lublin Triangle (Ukraine–Poland–Lithuania), which has acquired new dynamics since 2022. This format facilitates the coordination of political positions, security initiatives and information policy in the region (Demchyshak, 2024).


The Lublin Triangle contributes to the coordination of positions on supporting Ukraine, promoting its European integration and countering hybrid threats, in particular through joint media projects and combating disinformation. In the security sphere, the triangle supports initiatives such as the Central European Shield and the Eastern Shield, strengthening NATO's eastern flank, while Poland played a leading role in founding the

Coalition Against the Grain Blockade, under which it has actively defended the interests of Ukrainian exports in Europe (Pelletier, 2024). Despite challenges such as economic disputes and the need for external funding, the Lublin Triangle has the potential to expand and include other countries in the region, which might enhance its impact on regional security and integration with the EU and NATO.

Regarding the educational and humanitarian fields, there has been an expansion of academic exchange. Polish universities have offered Ukrainian students and teachers preferential study conditions, launched mobility programs, and set up joint research platforms (Gavrikova, 2022, 120). Initiatives are also being implemented to restore the educational process aligned with the Ukrainian curriculum for Ukrainian children who are temporarily staying in Poland. For example, a Ukrainian educational center for children was established in Krakow, where education is conducted in their native language (Chorna, 2022). The partnership also covers the cultural sphere with dozens of Polish cities holding festivals, exhibitions and performances by Ukrainian artists, painters and writers. These events have not only a symbolic meaning but also a strategic significance, contributing to the formation of a positive image of Ukraine in the EU (Fycyk, L. & Fycyk, I., 2024). Support for Ukrainian culture is an element of Poland's public diplomacy, which fosters appreciation for Ukraine as a European country with deep humanistic values (Kryshtal & Istomin, 2024).

In economic terms, Poland has become a critically important partner: more than 30% of Ukrainian exports in 2023 were carried out via the Polish infrastructure (Kurylyak & Muravskyy & Robeyko, 2025, 170). In particular, grain, oil products, and metallurgical products were transported through the ports of Gdansk and Gdynia. Polish companies have also begun to invest in the Ukrainian economy, especially in logistics, IT and the light industry. Ukrainian businesses, in turn, are opening branches in Poland, adapting to new market conditions.

The coordination of Ukraine's reconstruction is another key area of cooperation, which is a relevant part of the Lublin Triangle collaboration and broader regional initiatives. Poland has declared its readiness to lead this process. This role includes not only political support but also practical involvement in the restoration of Ukraine's infrastructure, economy and social institutions destroyed by the war with Russia. Polish-Ukrainian



business forums are already in operation, with over 300 companies from both countries participating. These forums have become a platform for the development of economic cooperation, exchange of technologies and stimulation of investments. Poland's experience of reforms, in particular decentralization and digitalization, is valuable for Ukraine, with Polish models of decentralization, which have strengthened local self-government, and successful digitalization projects, such as e-government, serve as a guide for Ukrainian initiatives in the field of urban planning and community renewal (Gorbatenko, 2023). This cooperation not only contributes to the reconstruction of Ukraine, but also deepens its integration with Europe and strengthens its position in the context of future EU membership. The security dimension of the Ukrainian-Polish partnership is among its most dynamic and critically important aspects in the context of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since the very beginning of the war, Poland has shown itself not only as a neighbor who opened its borders to millions of Ukrainians but also as a strategic ally committed to long-term support in the defense sector. Poland's assistance has gone far beyond the supply of weapons and encompassed military exercises, logistics, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic support at the highest level (Drozdov, 2024). The joint training of military personnel is one of the most important elements of security cooperation. Poland has made its military training grounds and training bases available for training Ukrainian soldiers within the framework of EU and NATO missions. Several coordination centers in Poland both provide retraining of military personnel and implement programs to improve the skills of the command staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Melnyk & Hubytskyk, 2024, 125). Polish instructors work closely with Ukrainian units, helping them adapt to NATO standards.

Intelligence exchange between Poland and Ukraine is robust. Polish structures, including civil and military intelligence, work closely with relevant Ukrainian agencies, providing operational information on the movement of enemy forces, cyber threats, and internal processes in Belarus and Russia. Such interaction makes the timely detection and neutralization of threats possible, ensuring the effectiveness of Ukrainian operations on the front lines (Stępień-Załużka & Uliasz, 2023).

Cyber cooperation is also actively developing under the strategic partnership. In 2023, Ukraine and Poland implemented a joint initiative to monitor cybersecurity, within which analysts, IT specialists and artificial intelligence experts work together to identify phishing attacks, detect hacker attempts at interfering

with state registers and to analyze the behavior of pro-Russian botnets (Kruglashov & Sabadash, 2024, 42). Poland also assists Ukraine in the technical reinforcement of the cyber defense of state institutions, especially in the context of protecting electoral systems, citizen databases and financial transactions.

The protection of critical infrastructure is another area of collaboration. Ukraine has obtained from Poland not only generators, transformers and electricity storage systems but also access to decentralized energy supply technologies. Polish engineers are helping Ukrainian cities implement blackout resilience systems, in particular through micro-power plants, solar panels and backup energy management systems. These measures sustain the basic functioning of hospitals, administrations and educational institutions during massive attacks on the energy system (Fechko & Banasiewicz & Iliuchok, 2024).

Poland's involvement in the organization of evacuation logistics has a special place in security cooperation. Most humanitarian corridors that transport war casualties, children and the elderly pass through Polish borders. A large part of Western aid, from armored vehicles to medicines, also arrives via Poland (Kurylyak & Muravskyy & Robeyko, 2025, 170). Poland provides uninterrupted logistics, railway platforms, transit hubs and checkpoints that operate around the clock. Such infrastructural support has been essential to maintaining Ukraine's defense capabilities.

The partnership between Ukraine and Poland in the defense sector also comprises the joint development of security concepts for the region. Research centers of both countries regularly draw up analytical documents assessing the strategic situation in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, these documents are used by government structures when planning the defense budgets, determining priorities in arms procurement and implementing security sector reforms (Zuk, 2024).

The idea to establish a "Central European Shield" was one of such concepts. The Shield was meant as a new security configuration that would include Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states and other countries that feel directly threatened by the Russian Federation. Polish experts emphasize that such an initiative should be compatible with NATO, but also able to act autonomously in the event of delays or political inertia within the Alliance (Chaban & Elgström, 2023). This would allow participating countries to act promptly should the decisions of the Alliance be hampered by bureaucracy or political disagreements.

In June 2025, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia appealed to the EU to support the Eastern Shield and the Baltic



Defense Zone as projects of common European interest by allocating funding and resources to them. These projects involve the creation of multi-level defense fortifications along the EU's eastern border, which could become a basis for a broader concept of the Central European Shield. The aims of the initiative exceed military defense, also covering coordination in the political, economic and information spheres to counter hybrid threats from the Russian Federation. This includes the protection of critical infrastructure, the countering of cyberattacks and the combating of disinformation. For its part, Ukraine is interested in using the Polish experience in defense sector reforms, in particular on issues of civilian control of the army, effective procurement management and involvement of the private sector in the production of defense products. Polish experts offer training and analyze Ukrainian legislation for its compliance with EU and NATO standards (Komarnytsky, 2023).

Poland has also become a platform for setting up regional resilience hubs that work with Ukrainian communities on crisis management, emergency response, cyber training and information security. Such hubs organize simulation exercises, provide assistance in developing evacuation plans and help improve local management in conditions of war or destruction of infrastructure (Zymenko, 2024).

Poland's engagement in the documentation of war crimes is also notable. Polish lawyers, media experts and human rights activists cooperate with Ukrainian and international investigators to collect evidence, interview witnesses and analyze the actions of Russian armed groups. These activities are important not only in terms of justice but also as a safeguard against future conflicts in the region (Konstantynova & Zymenko, 2024, 76).

At the same time, it is important to note that active security cooperation contributes to increasing the two countries' mutual trust. According to recent polls, more than 70% of Ukrainians consider Poland not just an ally but also a guarantor of stability in the region. In turn, Poles express solidarity with Ukraine, seeing in its struggle a reflection of their own history, in particular, their resistance to totalitarianism and desire for independence (Bevz, 2023, 30).

The Ukrainian-Polish partnership, which originated as a response to an unprecedented military threat, is gradually developing into a systemic multidimensional interaction in all key areas of state, social and cultural life. Between 2022 and 2025, Poland became not only a strategic backup but also an initiator of new formats of cooperation, ranging from reconstruction to cultural diplomacy. Such a depth of relations indicates the trans-


formation of the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue from a crisis one to a strategic one (Chaban & Elgström, 2023).

The post-war reconstruction of Ukraine is one of the most promising directions of this dialogue. Poland not only has declared its readiness to actively participate in the reconstruction, but is in fact already preparing for this process institutionally. An intergovernmental commission for the coordination of economic partnership has been created, a mechanism for technical assistance for Ukrainian municipalities has been launched, and joint business platforms are in operation (Fechko & Banasiewicz & Iliuchok, 2024). Polish companies in the construction, logistics and energy sectors have experience in implementing projects in combat zones, which gives them a unique advantage in future tenders for infrastructure restoration. Besides humanitarian support, the economic component of the partnership involves a mutually beneficial integration of markets. According to the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, bilateral trade between the countries increased by 27 % in 2024, and Poland's share in Ukrainian exports reached 10.4%, second only to the EU as a whole (Kurylyak & Muravskyy & Robeyko, 2025, 170). In addition, the number of Ukrainian enterprises that have become permanent participants in the Polish business environment has increased in Poland, in particular in IT, logistics and medical services.

Investment programs form a separate niche. Poland's government has created several support instruments, from state guarantees for business to tax incentives for Polish companies that work in Ukraine. In cooperation with development banks, credit lines are being implemented to restore Ukrainian production in border regions. This mechanism is already being used under projects in the Volyn, Lviv, and Ternopil regions.

Humanitarian and educational cooperation is another important aspect. From 2022 to 2024, Polish universities accepted more than 40,000 Ukrainian students, many of whom were offered preferential study conditions. Joint study programs, teacher mobility, and centers of Ukrainian Studies have also been introduced (Gavrikova, 2022, 121). Polish universities actively involve Ukrainian scientists in joint research projects under Horizon Europe, Erasmus+, Marie Curie and other EU initiatives.

In culture, interaction is expanding at both the state and public levels. Polish cultural institutions actively support Ukrainian artists by organizing exhibitions, translations, public lectures and theater performances. The preservation of Ukraine's cultural heritage is a priority, with Polish museums taking care of hundreds of art objects evacuated from the war zone (Chorna,



2022). At the same time, there are over 100 Ukrainian cultural centers in Poland today which promote not only creative practices but also social adaptation.

It is important that culture has also become a tool of diplomacy. Joint cultural events, such as Ukrainian film festivals, music marathons in support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and charity auctions of works by Ukrainian artists play a role in fostering a positive image of Ukraine in Europe (Fycyk, L. & Fycyk, I. 2024).

The socio-legal dimension of the partnership also includes support for Ukrainian citizens who are forcibly residing in Poland. The Polish government has adopted a number of legal acts that regulate the legalization of status, access to healthcare, education, employment and social benefits for over 1.5 million Ukrainians (Ociepa-Kicińska & Gorzałczyńska-Koczkodaj, 2022, 7088). These regulations have become a precedent for humane migration policy in wartime and have been recognized by international organizations, including UNHCR and IOM.

At the same time, Poland is actively engaged in the protection of the rights of Ukrainians in the international legal field. Polish human rights organizations cooperate with Ukrainian prosecutors on documenting war crimes, in particular in Bucha, Izyum and Mariupol. Joint investigations are conducted, evidence bases are created, and materials are submitted to the International Criminal Court in The Hague (Stępień-Załucka & Uliasz, 2023, 77). Such cooperation is underpinned not only by the political will but also by professional expertise.

Poland's public diplomacy has an invaluable part in mobilizing international support for Ukraine. Polish politicians, diplomats, journalists and scholars speak up in Western media, at forums and in parliaments, arguing for consistent military and economic support for Ukraine (Zuk, 2024). Polish think tanks publish reports that call for long-term investments in the security of the region, where Ukraine is a key component (Bevz, 2023, 29).

The strengthening of the Ukrainian-Polish partnership is also accompanied by a rethinking of historical memory. Both states are engaged in dialogue on the difficult moments of their common past, including the Volyn tragedy. In 2023, joint memorial events were held, and the countries decided to set up a joint historical and memorial commission. This approach bespeaks the desire to move on from competing narratives toward building trust founded on truth and mutual respect (Kruglashov & Sabadash, 2024). Emphatically, the Ukrainian-Polish partnership

is no longer a temporary coalition formed against the backdrop of war. It is now a full-fledged model of a new type of flexible, horizontal and multi-level cooperation in Europe. It is based not only on government initiatives but also on the cooperation of universities, businesses, public organizations, cultural institutions and citizens themselves. This is the strength of and a perspective for the union that has been tested by war and emerged from it even stronger.


Conclusions and implications for further research

Being in the epicenter of a powerful armed conflict, Ukraine is a key testing ground for the effectiveness of new security strategies. Its experience in building national resilience, cyber defense, interaction with international partners and informational counteraction to the aggressor is a relevant source of knowledge for future security policy models.

The security dimension of the Ukrainian-Polish partnership exhibits a high level of adaptability and strategic coordination. Poland acts not only as a provider of military and humanitarian assistance but also as a key coordinator of international support for Ukraine. Further research should explore the long-term impact of this partnership on the security architecture of Central and Eastern Europe and assess the effectiveness of joint cyber and intelligence initiatives.

Poland has provided powerful political, humanitarian, economic, financial and military-technical support to Ukraine. Its military assistance during the full-scale war has covered significant areas of supply of weapons, ammunition and equipment, whose total worth exceeds 4 billion EUR. Ukraine received almost 400 tanks, several dozen combat aircraft and helicopters, hundreds of artillery and anti-aircraft installations, as well as machine guns, shells, and medicines. Poland plays a major role in the delivery of Western weapons and military gear to Ukraine through its territory, and the damaged equipment is repaired at Polish military-defense companies. On 8th July 2024, Poland signed an Agreement on Security Cooperation with Ukraine, whose provisions cover significant military support and assistance to Ukraine.

Poland's and other partner states' military assistance to Ukraine has been instrumental in enabling Ukraine to stop Russian aggression and continue the struggle to restore full sovereignty of Ukraine. The fact that the Russo-Ukrainian war



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
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