

Abstract

The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China from 1991 to 2025 in the context of the evolution of the international order after the end of the Cold War. It is shown that in this period China transformed from a regional player into a key pole of power in the global international system. The main principles and directions of Chinese diplomacy are explained, including "peaceful development," "five principles of peaceful coexistence," and the concept of "a community with a shared future for humankind." Particular attention is paid to the "One Belt, One Road" project, which has become an instrument for implementing the PRC's soft power and a means of promoting Beijing's economic and political interests internationally. China's relations with its leading partners—the U.S., the European Union, Russia, and India—the dynamics of its policy towards Taiwan, and its participation in international organizations and relations with Ukraine in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war are analyzed. The article shows that Chinese foreign policy combines economic pragmatism and global ambitions, with its strategic goal being to produce a post-Western, multipolar world order with the dominance of Chinese values and norms. The conclusion outlines implications for further research on the impact of the Chinese model of global leadership on the structure of international institutions, the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region, and the transformation of the global governance system.

Keywords

China, foreign policy, soft power, "One Belt, One Road," international order, multipolarity


Abstrakt

Artykuł przedstawia kompleksową analizę polityki zagranicznej Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej w latach 1991–2025 w kontekście ewolucji porządku międzynarodowego po zakończeniu zimnej wojny. Pokazano, że w tym okresie Chiny przekształciły się z regionalnego gracza w kluczowy biegun siły w globalnym systemie międzynarodowym. Wyjaśniono główne zasady i kierunki chińskiej dyplomacji, w tym „pokojowy rozwój”, „pięć zasad pokojowego współistnienia”, koncepcję „wspólnoty o wspólnej przyszłości dla ludzkości”. Szczególną uwagę zwrócono na projekt „Jeden Pas, Jedna Droga”, który stał się instrumentem „miękkiej siły” ChRL, a także środkiem promocji interesów gospodarczych i politycznych Pekinu na arenie międzynarodowej. Artykuł analizuje relacje Chin z głównymi partnerami – Stanami Zjednoczonymi, Unią Europejską, Rosją i Indiami – dynamikę chińskiej polityki wobec Tajwanu, a także udział Chin w organizacjach międzynarodowych i relacje z Ukrainą w kontekście wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej. Wykazano, że chińska polityka zagraniczna łączy pragmatyzm gospodarczy z globalnymi ambicjami, a jej strategicznym celem jest kształtowanie postzachodniego, wielobiegunowego ładu światowego, w którym dominować będą chińskie wartości i normy. W wnioskach nakreślono perspektywę dalszych badań nad wpływem chińskiego modelu globalnego przywództwa na strukturę instytucji międzynarodowych, architekturę bezpieczeństwa regionu Azji i Pacyfiku oraz transformację globalnego systemu zarządzania.

Słowa kluczowe

Tajwan, Chiny, USA, sprawa Tajwanu, postęp technologiczny, bezpieczeństwo narodowe, analiza SWOT

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Introduction

Statement of the problem. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has been a key actor in global politics and economy since the end of the 20th century. After the end of the Cold War, the United States of America (U.S.) temporarily established itself as the sole center of power. At the same time, China began to consistently develop its power, combining a new economic liberalization and the old political control by the Communist Party. This "Chinese paradox" was based on the symbiosis of the market and authoritarianism and became a basis for the success of the modernization strategy. It gradually elevated the PRC from the position of a "second-rate" state to the level of a world leader. From 1991 to 2025, Chinese foreign policy evolved from a cautious adaptation to the Western-centric world order to concerted pursuits to transform this order. Officially, Beijing moved from the policy of "hiding its strength, biding its time" (as defined by Deng Xiaoping) to the "great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" of the Xi Jinping era. This course of action combines economic expansion, institutional creativity, ideological self-affirmation, and founding new norms of global interaction.


The research interest of the issues addressed in this article lies in the fact that China has become not only an object but also a subject in the foundation of a new world order. Its actions directly affect the balance of power in the system of international relations, the operations of global institutions, the interaction between the North and the South, and the prospects of global governance in the 21st century.

The purpose of this article is to offer a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of key principles and aspects of the PRC's foreign policy between 1991 and 2025 and to explain China's role in constructing a new world order that is emerging in the aftermath of the era of American hegemony.

The objectives of the study are 1) to retrace the main stages of the transformation of China's foreign policy after the Cold War; 2) to identify the current key ideological and strategic principles of China's approach to international relations; 3) to analyze the institutional, economic, and military-political instruments for establishing Chinese influence; 4) to describe China's vision of a new world order in conceptual documents and practices; and 5) to outline the major trajectories that the future global order may follow, allowing for the Chinese factor.

Methodologically, the study is based on is the principles of systemic, historical-comparative, and civilizational analysis and the concepts of multipolarity, global governance, and neorealism. It is underpinned by an interdisciplinary approach, combining the tools of political science, history of international relations, geopolitics, and geoeconomics. The historical-genetic method was applied to identify the evolution of the Chinese strategy in connection with the transformation of the world system, and the methods of generalization and comparative analysis helped us trace changes in the PRC's political discourse and practices in the international arena.

The historical literature on the problem is quite multifaceted. Among Western researchers, significant contributions to the study of the Chinese phenomenon were made by G. Kissinger, J. Nye, J. Mearsheimer, M. Jacques, E. Friedman, who regarded China as the main competitor of the U.S. in the institution of the post-hegemonic world. Chinese authors, in particular Liu Zhan, Feng Ping, Yan Xuetung, Zhao Tingyan, Wang Hun, and Li Jingcheng, have proposed the concepts of "moral realism" and "comprehensive security," which reflects Beijing's official dedication to building an alternative system of global governance. In Eastern European scholarship, the issue of Chinese growth has been analyzed by M. Adamchuk, P. Bednarek, S. Bielań, Y. Bilovska, R. Bozhko, B. Golyanych, T. Dmochovsky, L. Dorosh, V. Kiktenko, K. Kozlovsky, R. Kuźniar, D. Likarchuk, O. Senchenko, T. Sergienko, O. Shevchuk, S. Troyan, M. Yablonska, I. Zhaloba, and others, who have focused on the conceptual foundations of China's foreign policy, the pragmatic, civilizational and axiological dimensions of China's policy, Beijing's official international projects and initiatives, and the PRC's relations with Taiwan. Besides, the key aspects of China's modern foreign policy, in particular the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, were discussed in the special issue of *Culture – History – Globalization* (2017). Asian scholars, in particular B. Auelbeyev, K. Baizakova, K. Batyrbayev, S. Kozhyrova, A. Kurmashev, V. Paramonov, N. Pusyrmanov, A. Slamgazy, S. Yessyrken, Zh. Zhappassov, and others have also produced a versatile body of publications on various aspects of China's foreign policy, the role and place of China in the transformation of the modern international system, and its commitment to the construction of a new world order. Despite this profusion of research, a comprehensive understanding of China's role in the formation of a new world order remains an open question. Given this, our study is relevant as a contribution to research and theory.



Argument

I. Stages of evolution and key strategies of the PRC in the post-bipolar era. The PRC's foreign policy went through three main stages in the late 20th and the first quarter of the 21st centuries. In each of these stages, corresponding conceptual schemes were introduced into domestic and foreign policy in order to strengthen China's foundations as a state and its international positions (Kultura – Historia – Globalizacja, 2017). The first stage was the transition from isolation to integration (1991–2001). After the collapse of the USSR and amid the internal crisis caused by the Tiananmen Square events (1989), Beijing found itself facing a new international situation of U.S. dominance. While the disappearance of the Soviet threat enabled the PRC to normalize relations with Russia, it also consolidated the status of the United States as the sole superpower (Huntington, 1999), which caused concern for the Communist Party of China (CPC).

During this period, China had no clear global ambitions yet and was focused on domestic development, strictly following Deng Xiaoping's policy of "hiding one's strength, biding one's time" (tāoguāng yǎnghuì). Its foreign policy was subordinated to economic interests, which included attracting foreign investment and technology, ensuring stability at the borders, and integrating with the world economy. This stage culminated in China joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which became a symbol of the country's irreversible involvement with the system of global capitalism (Kultura – Historia – Globalizacja, 2017). At the same time, this opened vast new markets for China and raised the question of its strategic independence in the context of dominant Western institutions.

The second stage brought "peaceful rise" and harmonization (2002–2012). The period of Hu Jintao's rule (2002–2012) was marked by efforts to harmonize the frenetic economic growth (over 10 % per year) with the concept of "peaceful rise" (héping juéqǐ), which was later rephrased as "peaceful development." This doctrine was meant to dispel the international community's fears about Chinese expansion and to prove that the rise of the PRC was not a threat. In this stage, China began to actively implement the policy of soft power (Nye, 2002, 2018, 2021), which pursued three basic objectives. One of them was image building, in particular the foundation of Confucius Institutes around the world and the holding of large-scale events, such as the Olympics Games in Beijing (2008). Another was multilateralism, that is, the strengthening of


China's role in the UN and regional organizations (e.g., Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO; Asia-Pacific Cooperation, APEC) and the establishment of the BRICS association (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in 2009 as the first alternative platform to the G 7 group. The third objective was economic diplomacy with a focus on investments in Africa and Latin America, where Beijing offered assistance without political conditions (unlike Western countries), which significantly increased its political influence in the Global South. China also began to exhibit regional ambitions and use its economic potential as a geopolitical tool.

The third stage heralded a "new era" and global revisionism (2013–2025). A cardinal change in foreign policy was associated with Xi Jinping's accession to power in 2012. China proclaimed itself a "new-type great power" (xīnxíng dàguó guānxì). This was in line with the doctrine of the "Chinese Dream" (Zhōngguó Mèng), with its main goal being "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" by 2049 (Lubina, 2022).

From a policy of "non-interference," Beijing gradually moved to active intervention in regional and global security processes, and from the tactics of imitating the West to the strategy of devising alternative institutions and development models. At this time, several basic foreign policy strategies were developed and began to be implemented by China. The key strategies of the "new era" era notably included the megaproject of "One Belt, One Road" (BRI). Launched in 2013, the project involved approximately 140 countries and became the central instrument of China's foreign policy. This megaproject envisaged the foundation of a global infrastructure network, ensuring the economic and geopolitical integration of countries along the "belts" and "roads" with the center in Beijing. BRI posed a direct challenge to the world's trade system focused on the West-controlled sea routes (Kultura – Historia – Globalizacja, 2017).

The transformation of China's foreign policy also comprised strategic militarization and aggressive diplomacy. Beijing significantly increased its military spending, expanded its navy, and actively militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea. This was accompanied by "wolf warrior diplomacy" (zhànláng wàijiāo), meaning an aggressive and harsh response to Western criticism. It was at this time that the concept of "sharp" or "hard" Chinese power emerged to denote its active policy of information, political, and diplomatic pressure (Nye, 2018).

Confrontation with the West was another key strategy of the PRC. Its relations with the U.S. entered a phase of strate-



gic rivalry (Competition, Confrontation, Coexistence), including trade wars, technological deterrence (semiconductors, 5 G), and escalated tensions around Taiwan. Beijing took advantage of international crises, such as the war in Ukraine, to strengthen its position against the U.S. by establishing “an endless partnership” with Russia (Lubina, 2022). China was also actively engaged in the foundation of alternative institutions. In particular, it initiated the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and supported an active expansion of the BRICS (especially from 2024) with a view to transforming it into a full-fledged economic and political bloc of countries seeking an alternative to Western leadership.

In the post-bipolar era, the PRC consistently went from cautious integration with the global system to the development of its own strategic vision of the world order (Kuźniar, 2011; Bieleń, 2021). The evolution of its foreign policy was marked by the transition from the concept of “hiding one’s strength” (Deng Xiaoping) to the proactive assertion of its status as a great power (Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”). China’s key strategies of this period—“peaceful rise,” “One Belt, One Road,” and “a community with a shared future for humankind”—reflected its aspiration to combine economic expansion and political influence. Thus, modern China acted not only as an engine of globalization but also as an influential architect of an alternative model of international relations.

II. The PRC in the system of great powers: Strategic dimensions and geopolitical vectors. The PRC’s foreign policy is based on the ideological principles of the “Chinese dream” and the strategic implementation of the “One Belt, One Road” project. This approach is determined by China’s place in the dynamic hierarchy of great powers. Beijing’s relations with key global and regional actors, including the U.S., the European Union, the Russian Federation, and India, shape the architecture of the modern international order, which results from the transition from unipolarity to polycentricity against the background of the “rise of the Others” (Zakaria, 2008).

A. Strategic rivalry with USA. The PRC-U.S. relations are the main axis of Beijing’s foreign policy dynamics and a defining configuration of world politics today. After a period of “strategic engagement” in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the Xi Jinping era has been marked by a shift to structural rivalry and intense competition, which Washington officially qualifies as “great power strategic competition” (Friedman, 2021). This competition encompasses five key dimensions.


Technological hegemony is the first dimension. In this respect, the confrontation is centered around leadership in critical technologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and, most importantly, semiconductors. The U.S. policy of restricting China’s access to high-tech equipment and imposing export controls is a direct instrument of “technological containment” (decoupling). Beijing responds with strategies of “dual circulation” and technological self-sufficiency.

Trade and the economy are the second dimension. The launching of the “trade war” by the Donald Trump administration in 2018–2020 catalyzed tensions as a result of high tariffs and accusations of unfair trade practices (theft of intellectual property, subsidizing state-owned companies, etc.). The Biden administration continued the policy of pressure, focusing on the security aspects of economic ties (de-risking).

The military and security are the third dimension. Tensions are increasing in the Indo-Pacific region, especially around the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The U.S. is strengthening regional alliances (QUAD, AUKUS) to “encircle” China and maintain the regional balance of power. At the same time, Beijing is investing in the modernization of the PLA, strengthening its “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD).

In this respect, the issue of “two Chinas” is of no small importance. U.S. support for Taiwan is a key factor in regional security. Despite the official endorsement of the “one China” policy by the U.S. (this being Washington’s interpretation, but not Beijing’s), the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 obligates the U.S. to provide Taiwan with means of self-defense. This policy of “strategic uncertainty” is an important element of the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait (Quirk, 2021). The problem of “two Chinas” goes beyond a purely historical or internal conflict. It has become a critical point of wider tensions, especially in Beijing-Taipei and Beijing-Washington relations, and directly affects global security, economic stability, and the balance of power between major political and economic actors, turning the Taiwan Strait into one of the world’s most dangerous zones (Pomerantsev, 2015; Cochran, 2020; Shevchuk, 2022).

Ideology and values are the fourth dimension. As viewed by the U.S., the confrontation is a struggle between liberal democracy and authoritarian socialism. The PRC accuses Washington of interfering in its internal affairs (the issues of Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Tibet) and attempting to impose “Western values,” as a response to which Beijing offers its own model of governance.



Accordingly, global governance is the fifth dimension. The U.S. and the PRC compete for influence in international organizations and on the establishment of rules of conduct and regulation in the areas of climate, cybersecurity, and health care.

B. Multidimensional relations with the European Union.

The complex and multidimensional relationship between the PRC and the EU is characterized by a mixture of economic interdependence, competition, and systemic rivalry (Reznikiva & Ivashchenko, 2015). Since 2019, the official EU position has regarded the PRC simultaneously as a cooperation partner (on the climate and global health), an economic competitor (in technology and on global markets), and a systemic rival (due to fundamental differences on politics, human rights, and respect for international law).

The EU is one of China's main trading partners. However, Brussels is expressing increasing concerns about trade imbalances, unequal access to markets, forced technology transfers, and the use of state subsidies by Chinese companies. In contrast to the American "decoupling," Europe has chosen the strategy of "de-risking," which aims to reduce its critical dependence on China in strategic supply chains (e.g., critical raw materials) without completely severing economic ties. In this context, the Belt and Road Initiative is perceived in Europe in two ways, specifically as opportunity for Chinese investment (e.g., in Greece and Hungary) and as a potential threat to unity and security (given China's influence in Central and Eastern Europe).

China's position on Russia's aggression against Ukraine, combining reluctance to condemn the Russian Federation and support for the Kremlin's narratives, has significantly worsened China's political relations with most EU members. At the same time, the European policy of "strategic autonomy" enables Brussels to walk the line between Washington's pressure and Europe's economic interests in cooperation with Beijing.


C. Asymmetrical strategic partnership with the Russian Federation. Relations between Beijing and Moscow are officially characterized as "a comprehensive strategic partnership and cooperation in a new era" based on "boundless friendship" (Authoritarian Sharp Power, 2018). Being a pragmatic anti-Western alliance, this partnership is essentially asymmetrical (Lubina, 2022). The two states are united by their common interest in opposing U.S. dominance, criticizing NATO expansion, and supporting a multipolar world. They actively cooperate within the SCO and BRICS, and conduct joint military exercises. However, despite

their official rhetoric, their relations are asymmetrical in favor of Beijing (Paramonov, 2023). Having an economic edge, China has made Russia a supplier of raw materials (oil, gas, and coal) and a dependent partner. The PRC is more cautious and seeks to avoid secondary sanctions and any excessive financial or military dependence on Moscow.

In particular, after the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, China effectively adopted the position of a "neutral mediator"; the PRC did not publicly condemn the aggression, but it did not provide Russia with direct military assistance either. In practice, this position helped China obtain considerable advantages: 1) lower-priced energy resources (purchase of Russian oil and gas at significant discounts), which reinforced the PRC's energy security; 2) strategic weakening of Russia; Russia's declining international status and economic isolation make it more dependent on Beijing as a junior partner; 3) testing the effectiveness of Western sanctions; China uses the war as a "testing ground" to assess the efficacy of Western sanctions, which is critically important for its strategic planning on Taiwan.

D. Competitive cooperation with India. The PRC-India relationship is dual as the countries are geopolitical rivals and, at the same time, regional partners in multilateral formats (Singh, 2013). Both are the world's most populous countries and powerful regional powers competing for influence in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Global South. India views the BRI as an "encirclement" tool (through the construction of ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar—the "Pearl of the Necklace") or a Chinese version of the "Anaconda Doctrine." The undemarcated border in the Himalayas (the Line of Actual Control, LAC) is a constant source of tension between the two states. Armed clashes in the Galwan Valley in 2020 resulted in casualties and revealed a deep mutual distrust and a potential for escalation, effectively freezing bilateral relations for several years.

However, despite differences, China and India are gradually establishing cooperation. In 2024 and 2025, they adopted common positions on a number of issues, in particular, opposing pressure from the U.S. and continuing energy cooperation with Russia. This was evidenced by the shared or close positions China and India took at multilateral meeting and the BRICS summit in Beijing in early September 2025. Both states actively cooperate in international associations that advocate for reforming the world order. This primarily concerns the BRICS as a platform for coordinating economic policy and offsetting the influence of the G7 and the SCO as a platform for security cooperation and combating



terrorism in Central Asia. Both countries also style themselves into leaders of the Global South, competing for moral and political leadership among developing countries.

China's position in the system of great powers is defined by a complex matrix of strategic competition (with the U.S. and India), pragmatic alliance (with Russia), and balanced interdependence (with the EU). Beijing's main goal is to remake the world order and achieve the status of a dominant global power by the mid-21st century.

III. China's influence on the genesis and construction of a new world order. Over the past three decades, the PRC has become one of the most influential actors in the transformation of the world order. Its rapid economic growth, active foreign policy expansion, combination of market mechanisms with political centralization, and unique model of civilizational self-preservation have added up to a special type of global subjectivity. China has integrated with the world system and has become one of the key architects of the new order, which is increasingly departing from the liberal paradigm established after the Cold War (Nye, 2002; Kuźniar, 2022).

The genesis of the new world order is directly related to the process of post-Western globalization, which means a gradual transition from unipolarity to polycentrism. China has become a central factor in this process, demonstrating an alternative model of development in which economic openness is coupled with political authoritarianism and civilizational conservatism. As the Western consensus has been weakening as a result of crises in liberal democracy, financial instability, and the loss of moral leadership by the United States, the Chinese example has come to be perceived as an effective alternative.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, Beijing has consistently promoted the concept of "a community of shared future for humankind," which is the ideological basis of the Chinese vision of a new world order. It is founded on the notion of the rejection of hegemony, equal partnership, and mutually beneficial development. Formally, this concept appeals to universalist principles, but its practical implementation involves repositioning the centers of influence from the transatlantic to the Asia-Pacific region and consolidating China's dominance in it.

Geoeconomics is the main tool of Chinese influence. Launched in 2013, the "One Belt, One Road" initiative (BRI) has become the largest project of the world's economic and infra-

structural integration with the center in China. Beijing has been using a network of transport corridors, energy routes, port concessions, and logistic hubs to structure a new regional and global geoeconomic architecture, where economic interdependence is gradually turning into political dependence (Yessirkep, Abdrakhmanova, Zhumashov, & Pussyrmanov, 2025). At the same time, China is actively building a system of alternative institutions of global governance. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New BRICS Development Bank, and currency swaps in yuan contribute to the de-dollarization of international payments and the strengthening of China's role in the global financial system. In fact, a "parallel infrastructure of globalization" is being formed, which undermines the monopoly of Western institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO. In general, the Chinese expansion model is not based on direct coercion, but relies on a blend of economic incentives and cultural appeal. It generates a new form of influence underpinned by a strategy in which the logic of economic profit is combined with long-term geopolitical interests, which might tentatively be called "infrastructural realism" (Kozhirova, Batyrbayev, & Li Jingcheng, 2024; Slamgazy, Liu, Zhappassov, & Tassilova, 2024; Auelbeyev & Kurmashev, 2023; Kas-senova & Duprey, 2021).

China's concept of civilization is an important component of its influence. Invoking the historical legacy of the idea of "the middle state" (Zhōngguó), the Chinese civilizational model has a value system of its own, which differs from the Western one. It is essentially informed by the principles of collectivism, moral harmony, and the primacy of communal stability over individual freedom. This worldview influences the interpretation of the international order; if the concept of "rules" is crucial to the liberal West, China prioritizes "relations" and "harmony." This approach helps the PRC arbitrate in regional disputes, offering "Chinese modernity" as a third way between liberal democracy and authoritarian isolationism. In the global context, this means the establishment of a "civilizational pluralism" policy that opposes the universalism of Western values. China relies on its cultural institutions, educational programs, network of Confucius Institutes, and media platforms to craft its symbolic space in a world where soft power is harnessed to the strategic goals of the state.

The construction of a new world order with China as its leader is taking place through gradual shifts in emphasis: from Western institutions to hybrid ones, from the hegemony of force to the hegemony of infrastructure, from political control to net-



work interdependence, etc. This type of order can be described as an asymmetrical multipolarity (Trojan & Kyrydon, 2024), in which China does not seek formal dominance, but creates a system of “mutual orbits of influence,” which is determined by economic, cultural, and technological ties.

Beijing does not put forward an explicit “doctrine of a new world order” in the Western sense. However, in practice, its policy produces an alternative normative space with key principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, the primacy of stability over regime change, political multivariance, and cultural tolerance in the framework of authoritarian modernization. All this creates a basis for the so-called “post-liberal consensus,” in which China is both an opponent of the West and its “system corrector.” At the same time, the Chinese approach to the world order has internal contradictions. Its civilizational universality is limited by the pragmatism of foreign policy while the rhetoric of “harmony” often conceals economic pressure, and the policy of “mutual benefit” involves the asymmetry of resources. Yet, despite these contradictions, China is a state with a long-term concept of global development, which is supported by material, technological, and cultural resources.

In the 21st century, China is the key actor in the transformation of the global system, not as a destroyer of the old order but as its reconfigurator. The PRC’s influence is evident in recasting geoeconomic priorities, reformatting international institutions, and establishing new moral and cultural guidelines for global interaction. In this sense, the “China factor” is not only a challenge to the West but also a stimulus for rethinking the very nature of the world order, its current problems, and conflicts related to increasing deliberalization, generation of tensions, and chaos in international relations.


Conclusion

China’s role in the genesis and construction of a new world order is systemic and multidimensional. It encompasses economic, political, civilizational, technological, and ideological spheres, changing not only the balance of power but also the very logic of global interaction. China does not simply adapt to the existing order, but also devises new rules of the game, which promote stability, manageability, and institutional multipolarity. The current world order is increasingly taking on the features of “Chinese modernity” as a merger of the market principles and

state control, global integration and cultural isolationism, technological progress and ideological conservatism. This duality reflects the very nature of China’s civilizational strategy, which combines pragmatism and historical mission. The evolution of China’s foreign policy in the post-bipolar era is a vivid example of the restoration of a state’s historical influence based on its unprecedented economic growth. China has moved from pragmatic conformity to global revisionism. Beijing’s main goal in the global environment, where Western liberal democracy is no longer the sole leading model, is to ensure that the PRC is recognized as one of the two or three major world powers. Based on the ideology of “community with a shared future for humankind” (which is, in essence, a Beijing-oriented Chinese version of multipolarity), this policy indicates that China is actively shaping a new world order rather than “biding its time.” The evolution of the PRC’s foreign policy from 1991 to 2025 corresponded to its transition from a peripheral status to the position of one of the main architects of the global order. In this period, China not only adapted to existing international structures, but also began to fashion its own system of norms, institutions, and values. Its strategy comprised three interrelated levels: economy, by ensuring its global presence through investment, trade, and infrastructure; ideology, by launching a discourse alternative to the liberal worldview; and geopolitics, by gradually eroding Western dominance without direct confrontation.


In the long term, the greatest challenge for Beijing will be to find the way between increasing its power and preventing the establishment of a coalition against it. The configuration of a new, multipolar but not chaotic, world order, with the PRC striving to be not only a power but also the center of civilization, will depend on the effectiveness of China’s integration of its interests with the system of global governance.

To achieve a sound scholarly understanding of the Chinese phenomenon, further research is needed in areas such as the transformation of global leadership models, the role of China in the post-Western value system, new forms of neo-imperial influence, and the interplay of national interests and global responsibility. These are the primary areas that will determine the future of both the PRC itself and the world order in the 21st century.



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